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Trevisan has shown that constructions of pseudo-random generators from hard functions
(the Nisan–Wigderson approach) also produce extractors. We show that constructions of
pseudo-random generators from one-way permutations (the Blum–Micali–Yao approach)
can be used for building extractors as well. Using this new technique we build extractors
that do not use designs or polynomial-based error-correcting codes and that are very
simple and efficient. For example, one extractor produces each output bit separately in
O(log2 n) time. These extractors work for weak sources with min-entropy λn, for arbitrary
constant λ > 0, have seed length O(log2 n), and their output length is≈ nλ/3.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
This paper puts forward a new framework for constructing extractors based on a new connection between extractors
and pseudo-random generators. Surely, in some regards, there are obvious similarities between the two concepts. A pseudo-
random generator takes as input a short random string called the seed and outputs a long string that cannot be distinguished
from a truly random string by any test that is computable by circuits of bounded size. An extractor has two inputs: (a) The
first one comes from an imperfect (i.e., with biased bits and correlations among bits) distribution on binary strings of some
length and it is called the weakly-random string; (b) the second one is a short random seed. The output is a long string
that cannot be distinguished from a truly random string by any test. One difference between pseudo-random generators
and extractors is the number of inputs (one versus two). From a technical point of view this difference is minor because
the known constructions of pseudo-random generators implicitly do use an extra input which is a function that in some
sense is computationally hard. The fundamental difference is in the randomness requirement for the output. Thus, while
the output of a pseudo-random generator looks random in a complexity-theoretic way, the output of an extractor is random
(or very close to random) in an absolute information-theoreticway. Consequently pseudo-randomgenerators and extractors
appear to belong to two very different worlds, and, for many years, the developments in the construction of pseudo-random
generators and extractors went along distinct research lines.
Trevisan [17] has made a breakthrough contribution in this area by observing that the (apparently superficial) similarity
between extractors and pseudo-random generators extends to some of themethods to build the two kind of objects. For the
reasons mentioned above, Trevisan’s result has been extremely surprising. It has also been an isolated example of a transfer
from the complexity theory standard arsenal of techniques to the information theoretical area. In this paper we extend
Trevisan’s observation and establish that, as far as construction methods are concerned, there is a truly close relationship
between pseudo-random generators and extractors. Specifically, we show that the othermajor route (than the one followed
by Trevisan) that leads to pseudo-randomgenerators (of a somewhat different kind) can also be used to construct extractors.
Some explanations are in order at this point.
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There are two known approaches for constructing pseudo-random generators. One approach uses as a building block a
hard function f and, in one typical setting of parameters, for any given k ∈ N, builds a pseudo-random generator g with
outputs of length n that is secure against adversary tests computable in time nk. The running time to compute g(x) is nk
′
,
for some k′ > k. This kind of pseudo-random generators can be used for derandomizing BPP computations. They cannot be
used in cryptography, because in this setting, it is unwise to assume that the adversary is endowed with less computational
power (nk) than the legitimate users (nk
′
). Henceforthwewill call this type of pseudo-randomgenerator a ‘‘derandomization
pseudo-random generator’’ (also known as a Nisan–Wigderson pseudo-random generator).
The second approach uses as a building block a hard object of a more sophisticated type, namely a one-way function
(the hardness of such a function f consists in the difficulty to invert it, but f must satisfy an additional property, namely,
it should be easy to calculate f (x) given x). It is known that given a one-way function, one can construct a pseudo-
random generator [6]. An easier construction produces a pseudo-random generator from any one-way length-preserving
permutation. This second approach has the disadvantage that is using as a building block a more demanding type of object.
The advantage of the method is that a pseudo-random generator g constructed in this way can be used in cryptography
because g(x) can be calculated in time significantly shorter than the time an adversary must spend to distinguish g(x)
from a truly random string. Henceforth we will call this type of pseudo-random generator a ‘‘cryptographic pseudo-random
generator’’ (also known as a Blum–Micali–Yao pseudo-random generator).
Trevisan has shown that the knownmethods for constructing derandomization pseudo-random generators also produce
extractors. More precisely, he has shown that the constructions of pseudo-random generators from hard functions given
by Nisan and Wigderson [11] and Impagliazzo and Wigderson [9] can be used almost directly to produce extractors. His
method has been extended in a number of papers to build extractors with increasingly better parameters (see the survey
paper by Shaltiel [14]). In the paper [16], the conference version of [17], Trevisan has suggested that themethods to construct
cryptographic pseudo-random generator cannot be used to build extractors. We show that in fact they can, at least for a
combination of parameters that, even though not optimal, is not trivial. Moreover, we show that the extractors constructed
in this way are very simple and efficient.
An extractor can be viewed as a bipartite graph and is therefore a static finite object that can be constructed trivially
by exhaustive search. We are looking however for efficient constructions. Typically ‘‘efficient’’ means ‘‘polynomial time’’,
but one can envision different levels of efficiency and one remarkable such level would certainly be ‘‘linear time’’. The first
extractor built in this paper follows almost directly the classical construction of a pseudo-random generator from a one-
way permutation, and comes very close to this level of efficiency: Viewed as a procedure, it runs in O(n log n) time (in the
standard RAM model). In addition it is very simple. The following is a complete description of it. The input consists of the
weakly-random string X , of length n = n˜2n˜ for some integer n˜, and of the seed ((x1, . . . , x`), r), with |xi| = n˜, ` = O(n˜), and
|r| = `n˜. We view X as a function X : {0, 1}n˜ → {0, 1}n˜, and, using the standard procedure, we transform X into a circular
permutation R : {0, 1}n˜ → {0, 1}n˜. For i = 0 to m − 1 = nΩ(1), we calculate bi as the inner product modulo 2 of r and
(Ri(x1) . . . Ri(x`)). The output is b0 . . . bm−1.
Another remarkable level of efficiency which has received a lot of attention recently is that of sublinear time. It may be
the case that in some applications we only need the ith bit from the sequence of random bits that are extracted from the
weakly-random string.Wewould like to obtain this bit in time polynomial in the length of the index i, which typicallymeans
polylog time in the input length (under the assumption that each input bit can be accessed in one time unit). By analogywith
the case of list-decodable codes, we call an extractor with this property, a bitwise locally computable extractor.1 The second
extractor that we build is of this type. The algorithm deviates from the direct construction of a pseudo-random generator
from a one-way function. However it relies on a basic idea used in the construction of the first extractor, combined with the
idea of taking consecutive inputs of the hard function as in the extractor of Ta-Shma, Zuckerman and Safra [20]. This second
extractor is even simpler and its complete description is as follows. The input consists of the weakly-random string X of
length n = n˜ · 2n˜, for some natural number n˜, and of the seed ((x1, . . . , x`), r), with |xi| = n˜, for all i, ` = O(n˜), and |r| = `n˜.
We view X as the truth-table of a function X : {0, 1}n˜ → {0, 1}n˜. For i = 0 to m − 1 = nΩ(1), we calculate bi as the inner
product modulo 2 of r and (X(x1 + i), . . . , X(x` + i)), where the addition is done modulo 2n˜. The output is b0 . . . bm−1.
The parameters of the extractors constructed in this paper are not optimal. Both extractors that have been described
above work for weak sources having min-entropy λn, for arbitrary constant λ > 0, use a random seed of length O(log2 n),
and the output length is approximately nλ/3. A variant of the second extractor has seed length O(log n) (here, for simplicity,
we assume that the extractor’s error parameter  is a constant), but the output length reduces to 2O(
√
log n).
Lu’s extractor [10] coupledwith the constructions of designs from the paper of Hartman and Raz [7] can be seen to be also
a bitwise locally computable extractor with parameters similar to those of our second extractor (note that the designs in [7]
appear to imply extractors with seed length Ω(log2 n)). Lu’s extractor is using expander graphs and the designs from [7]
need somewhat unwieldy algebraic objects. It seems to us that the extractors presented in this paper are simpler than all
the extractors from the literature.2 At the highest level of abstraction, our extractors follow the ‘‘reconstruction paradigm’’
(see [14]) typical to Trevisan’s extractor and to its improvements [12,20,15]. The major differences are that our extractors
1 The simpler name locally computable extractor is already taken by a different kind of efficient extractors, namely by extractors whose outputs depend
only on a small number of the bits of the weakly-random string, see [21], [10].
2 We note that Dziembowski and Maurer [2] give a similarly simple construction of an object that is related to extractors.
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avoid (1) the use of designs (in this respect they are similar to the extractors in [20,15]), and, perhapsmore strikingly, (2) the
encoding of the weakly-random string with an error-correcting code having a good list-decoding property. Our extractors
can be implemented very easily and are thus suitable for practical applications. For example, they can be utilized to generate
one-time pad keys in cryptosystems based on the bounded-storagemodel (see the papers of Lu [10] and Vadhan [21]), or for
constructions of error-correcting codes using the scheme in [19] (the second extractor built in this paper is actually a strong
extractor – for definition see, for example [14] – as required by this scheme). They may also have theoretical applications in
situations where the kind of efficiency achieved by our extractors is essential.
2. Definitions
Notations: xy denotes the concatenation of the strings x and y, |x| denotes the length of the string x, and ‖A‖ denotes the
cardinality of the set A. We remind the standard definition of an extractor. Let n ∈ N. Let Xn, Yn be two distributions onΣn.
The statistical distance between Xn and Yn is denoted∆stat(Xn, Yn) and is defined by∆stat(Xn, Yn) = maxA⊆{0,1}n |Prob(Xn ∈
A)− Prob(Yn ∈ A)|.
If we view the sets A ⊆ {0, 1}n as statistical tests, then, by the above expression, ∆stat(Xn, Yn) ≤  signifies that
no test can distinguish between the distributions Xn and Yn except with a small bias . If we restrict to tests that can
be calculated by bounded circuits, we obtain the notion of computational distance between distributions. Namely, the
computational distance between Xn and Yn relative to size S is denoted∆comp,S(Xn, Yn) and is defined by∆comp,S(Xn, Yn) =
max |Prob(C(Xn) = 1)− Prob(C(Yn) = 1)|, where the maximum is taken over all circuits C of size ≤ S. Abusing notation,
we identify a circuit C with the set of strings x for which C(x) = 1. Thus, x ∈ C is equivalent to C(x) = 1.
The min-entropy of a distribution is a good indicator of the degree of randomness of the distribution. The min-entropy
of a random variable taking values in {0, 1}n is given by min
{
log 1Prob(X=a)
∣∣∣ a ∈ {0, 1}n, Prob(X = a) 6= 0}.
Thus if X has min-entropy ≥ k, then for all a in the range of X , Prob(X = a) ≤ 1/2k. For each n ∈ N, let Un denote the
uniform distribution over {0, 1}n. We are now ready to define an extractor formally.
Definition 2.1 (Extractor). The values n, k, d,m are integer parameters, and  > 0 is a real number parameter. A function
E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is a (k, )-extractor if for every distribution X on {0, 1}n with min-entropy at least k, the
distribution E(X,Ud) is -close to the uniform distribution Um in the statistical sense, i.e.,∆stat(E(X,Ud),Um) ≤ .
Thus, an extractor has as input (a) a string x produced by an imperfect source with distribution X , where the defect of the
distribution is measured by k = min-entropy(X), and (b) a random seed y of length d. The output is E(x, y), a string of length
m. The key property is that, for every subsetW ⊆ Σm,
|Probx∈X {0,1}n,y∈{0,1}d(E(x, y) ∈ W )− Probz∈Σm(z ∈ W )| ≤ . (1)
If we consider n and k as given (these are the parameters of the source), it is desirable that d is small, m is large,
and  is small. It can be shown nonconstructively that for every k ≤ n and  > 0, there exist extractors with d =
log(n − k) + 2 log(1/) + O(1) and m = k + d − 2 log(1/) − O(1). It has been shown [13] that these parameters
are optimal. Furthermore, we want the family of extractors to be efficiently computable. For simplicity, we have defined
individual extractors. However, implicitly we think of a family of extractors indexed by n and with the other parameters
being uniform functions of n. In this way we can talk about efficient constructions of extractors by looking at the time and
space required to calculate E(x, y) as functions of n.
An extractor E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m can also be viewed as a regular bipartite graph where the set of ‘‘left’’ nodes
is Vleft = {0, 1}n and the set of ‘‘right’’ nodes is Vright = {0, 1}m. The degree of each node in Vleft is 2d, and two nodes x ∈ Vleft
and z ∈ Vright are connected if there is y ∈ {0, 1}d such that E(x, y) = z. We can imagine that each x ∈ Vleft = {0, 1}n is
throwing 2d arrows at Vright = {0, 1}m.
To understand better equation (1), let us look deeper into the structure of an extractor. We fix parameters n, d,m and 
and a function E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m. Let us consider an arbitrary setW ⊆ {0, 1}m and a string x ∈ {0, 1}n. We say
that x hitsW -correctly via E if the fraction of outgoing edges from x that land inW is -close to the fraction ‖W‖/‖{0, 1}m‖,
i.e., ∣∣∣∣‖{E(x, y) | y ∈ {0, 1}d} ∩W‖‖{0, 1}d‖ − ‖W‖‖{0, 1}m‖
∣∣∣∣ ≤ .
If we look at a fixed x, it cannot hold that for everyW ⊆ {0, 1}m, x hitsW -correctly (for example, takeW = {E(x, y) | y ∈
{0, 1}d}). Fortunately, for E to be an extractor, all we need is that anyW ⊆ {0, 1}m is hit -correctly by most x ∈ {0, 1}n. The
following lemma has appeared more or less explicitly in the literature (see, for example, [14]).
Lemma 2.2. Let E : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m and  > 0. Suppose that for every W ⊆ {0, 1}m, the number of x ∈ {0, 1}n that
do not hit W -correctly via E is at most 2t , for some t. Then E is a (t + log(1/), 2)-extractor.
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Proof. Let X be a distribution on {0, 1}n with min-entropy at least t + log(1/) and let W be a subset of {0, 1}m. There
are at most 2t x’s that do not hit W -correctly and the distribution X allocates to these x’s a mass probability of at most
2t · 2−(t+log(1/)) = . We have,
Probx∈X {0,1}n,y∈{0,1}d(E(x, y) ∈ W ) = Probx∈X {0,1}n,y∈{0,1}d(E(x, y) ∈ W and x hitsW -correctly)
+ Probx∈X {0,1}n,y∈{0,1}d(E(x, y) ∈ W and x does not hitW -correctly).
The first term in the right hand side is between ‖W‖‖{0,1}m‖ −  and ‖W‖‖{0,1}m‖ + , because for each x that hitsW -correctly,
Proby∈{0,1}d(E(x, y) ∈ W ) ∈
[ ‖W‖
‖{0, 1}m‖ − ,
‖W‖
‖{0, 1}m‖ + 
]
.
The second term is bounded by
Probx∈X {0,1}n,y∈{0,1}d(x does not hitW -correctly),
which is, as we have seen, between 0 and . Plugging these estimates in the above equation, we obtain that∣∣∣∣Probx∈X {0,1}n,y∈{0,1}d(E(x, y) ∈ W )− ‖W‖‖{0, 1}m‖
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2.
Thus, E is a (t + log 1

, 2)-extractor. 
We recall the definition of a pseudo-random generator.
Definition 2.3 (Pseudo-random generator). Let `, L, S ∈ N and  > 0 be parameters. A function g : Σ l → Σ L is a pseudo-
random generator with security (, S) if∆comp,S(g(U`),UL) ≤ .
3. Overview and comparison with Trevisan’s approach
Trevisan’s method is based on the constructions of pseudo-random generators from hard functions given in [11] and
in [9]. These constructions use a function f as a black box and construct from it a function gf that stretches the input (i.e.,
|gf (x)| >> |x|) and which has the following property. If there exists a circuit D that distinguishes gf (x), when x is randomly
chosen in the domain of gf , from the uniform distribution, then there is a small circuit A, which uses D as a subroutine, such
that A calculates f (or an approximation of f , depending on whether we are using the method in [9] or the one in [11]).
Therefore if f is a hard function, there can be no circuit D as above of small size and thus gf is a pseudo-random generator.
Trevisan has observed that (1) the truth-table of f can be viewed as a string produced by a weak source that can serve as an
extra input of the pseudo-random generator, and (2) the circuit A invoking D can be considered as a special type of a circuit
that is endowedwith D-gates. By a standard counting argument, it can be shown that, for any circuit D, regardless of its size,
the set of functions that can be calculated by small circuits with D-gates is small. A circuit D can be viewed statically as a
statistical test (more exactly, the statistical test associated to the circuit D is the set of strings accepted by D). In the new
terminology, the fact that D distinguishes the distribution of gf (x) from the uniform distribution with  bias can be restated
as ‘‘f does not hitD -correctly via g ’’. Themain propertymentioned above can be restated as saying that the set of functions
f that do not hitD -correctly is included in the set of functions computable by small circuitswithD-gates. Since the latter set
is small, the former set is small as well, and thus, by Lemma 2.2, the construction yields an extractor. In a nutshell, Trevisan’s
method replaces hard functions (a complexity-theoretic concept)with random functions (an information-theoretic concept)
and takes advantage of the fact that a random function is hard and thus the construction carries over in the new setting.
We would like to follow a similar approach for the construction of cryptographic pseudo-random generators from one-
way permutations. Those constructions do use a one-way permutation R as a black box to construct a pseudo-random
generator gR, and thus a truth-table of R can be considered as an extra input of the pseudo-random generator. Also, the
proof is a reduction that shows that if a circuit D distinguishes gR(x) from the uniform distribution, then there is a small
circuit A, invoking the circuit D, that inverts R on a large fraction of inputs. To close the proof in a similar way to Trevisan’s
approach, wewould need to argue that the vast majority of permutations are one-way. It seems that we hit a major obstacle
because, unlike the case of hard functions, it is not currently known if even a single one-way function exists (and we are
seeking an unconditional proof for the extractors that we build). We go around this obstacle by allowing algorithms to have
oracle access to the function they compute. Thus, in the above analysis, the circuit A, in addition to invoking the circuit D,
will also have oracle access to the permutation R. In this setting all permutations are easy to compute because, obviously,
there is a trivial constant-time algorithm that, for any permutation R : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, given the possibility to query R,
calculates R(x). We need to argue that only few permutations R are invertible by algorithms that can query R in a bounded
fashion. More precisely we need to estimate the size of the set of permutations R : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n that can be inverted on
a set of T elements in {0, 1}n by circuits that can pose Q queries to R. This problem has been considered by Impagliazzo [8]
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and by Gennaro and Trevisan [5]. Their techniques seem to work for the case T · Q < 2n and lead to extractors that work
only for sources with high min-entropy.3
We obtain better parameters by restricting the type of one-way permutations and the type of circuits that attempt to
invert them. A second look at the standard construction of Blum–Micali–Yao pseudo-random generators reveals that the
circuit A with D-gates manages to determine x using only the values R(x), R2(x), . . . , Rm(x) (where m is the generator’s
output length). It is thus enough to consider only circuits that use this pattern of queries to the permutation R. Intuitively,
for a random permutation R, the value of x should be almost independent of the values of R(x), R2(x), . . . , Rm(x), and thus,
a circuit A restricted as above cannot invert but a very small fraction of permutations. If we take R to be a random circular
permutation, the above intuition can be easily turned into a proof based on a Kolmogorov complexity counting argument.
A circular permutation R : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is fully specified by the sequence (R(1), R2(1), . . . , RN−1(1)), where N = 2n.
If a circuit A restricted as above inverts R(x) for all x, then the permutation R is determined by the last m values in the
above sequence, namely RN−m(1), RN−(m−1)(1), . . . , RN−1(1). Indeed, given the above values, the circuit A can determine
RN−m−1(1), which is R−1(RN−m(1)), and then RN−m−2(1), and so on till R(1) is determined. Therefore such a permutation R,
given the circuit A, can be described concisely using only m · n bits (for specifying, as discussed, the last m elements in the
above sequence). In fact, in our case, the circuit A does not invert R(x) for all x ∈ {0, 1}n, and, therefore, the values of R at the
points where the inversion fails have to be included in the description. A further complication is that even for the successful
cases, the circuit A only list-inverts R(x), which means that A on input R(x) produces a relatively short list of elements, one
of which is x. Thus, one also has to include in the description of R the rank of x in the list produced by A. The quantitative
analysis of the standard construction of a cryptographic pseudo-random generator shows that if the permutation R does not
hit D -correctly, then the circuit A with D-gates is only able to produce for an /m fraction of R(x), x ∈ {0, 1}n, a list with
m2/2 elements one of which is x. For interesting values of m (the pseudo-generator’s output length), the /m fraction is
too small and needs to be amplified to a value of the form (1 − δ), for a small constant δ. This can be done by employing
another technique that is well known in the context of one-way functions. Namely, we use Yao’s method of converting a
weak one-way function into a strong one-way function by taking the direct product. In other words, we start with a circular
permutation R, define (the direct product) R(x1, . . . , x`) = R(x1) · · ·  R(x`) (where denotes concatenation), for some
appropriate value of `, and use R in the definition of the extractor (instead of R in our tentative plan sketched above). It can
be shown that, for ` = O((1/δ) log(1/γ )), if a circuit A list-inverts (y1, . . . , y`), with list size T = m2/2, for a γ = /m
fraction of `-tuples (y1, . . . , y`) ∈ ({0, 1}n)`, then there is a probabilistic algorithm A′ that list-inverts R(x) with list size
O(n · T · (1/δ) · (1/γ ) · log(1/γ )) for a (1 − δ) fraction of x ∈ {0, 1}n. By fixing the random bits and the queries that
depend on these random bits, we can obtain a brief description of R as in our first tentative plan. It follows that only few
permutations R can hit D -incorrectly and, therefore, by Lemma 2.2, we have almost obtained an extractor (we also need to
convert an arbitrary function X : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n into a circular permutation R : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, which is an easy task).
Briefly, the proof relies on the fact that if a permutation R does not hit D -correctly, then there must be a very strong
dependency between the ‘‘consecutive’’ values x, R(x), R2(x), . . . , Rm(x), for many x ∈ {0, 1}n, and only few permutations R
exhibit such dependencies.
The second extractor starts from this idea and the observation that, for the sake of building an extractor, we can work
with a function X (i.e., not necessarily a permutation) and consider consecutive values X(x), X(x+ 1), . . . , X(x+ m), as in
the extractor of Ta-Shma, Zuckerman, and Safra [20]. That extractor (as well as all the extractors using the ‘‘reconstruction
paradigm’’) takes X to be the encoding of an arbitrary function X with a good list-decoding property and some other special
algebraic properties. This is necessary, among other things, for the same type of amplification as in our discussion above.
We use instead a direct product construction that is much simpler to implement (however, the cost is a longer seed length).
4. Restricted permutations, restricted circuits
The space from where we randomly choose permutations consists of permutations of a special form. First we consider
the set CIRC of all circular permutations R : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. Next, for some parameter ` ∈ N, we take the `-direct
product of CIRC. This means that for any R ∈ CIRC, we define R` : {0, 1}`n → {0, 1}`n by R`(x1  x2  · · ·  x`) =
R(x1)  R(x2)  · · ·  R(x`). We let PERM` be the set {R` | R ∈ CIRC}. We will drop the subscript ` when its value is clear
from the context or when it is not relevant in the discussion.
Wewant to argue that no circuit that queries R in a restrictedway can invert a ‘‘large’’ fraction of R(x) except for a ‘‘small’’
fraction of permutations R in PERM. In order to obtain adequate values for ‘‘large’’ and ‘‘small’’ we will impose the following
restriction on the pattern of queries that the circuit can make.
Definition 4.1. An oracle circuit C on inputs of length at least ` · n is L-restricted if on any input x and for all oracles
R ∈ PERM`, C only queries xfirst, R(xfirst), R2(xfirst), . . . , RL−1(xfirst), where xfirst is the string consisting of the first ` · n bits of
x.
3 On the other hand, these extractors have the interesting property that their output looks random even to statistical tests that have some type of access
to the weakly-random string. These results will be reported in a separate paper.
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We will allow the circuits to attempt to invert R in a weaker form: On input R(x), CR outputs a small list of strings one of
which (in case C succeeds) is x. When this event happens, we say that CR list-inverts x. We are interested in estimating the
number of permutations R ∈ PERM so that CR list-inverts R(x) for a large fraction of x.
Definition 4.2. Let C be an oracle circuit. A permutation R is (γ , T )-good for C if for at least a γ fraction of x ∈ {0, 1}`n, CR
on input R(x) outputs a list of T elements that contains x.
We will show that a permutation that is (γ , T )-good for a restricted circuit C admits a short description conditioned by
C being given. This leads immediately to an estimation of the number of permutations R that are (γ , T )-good for a given
restricted circuit C .
Lemma 4.3. Let γ > 0, n ∈ N, L ∈ N, and T ∈ N. Let N = 2n. Let δ > 0 and let ` = ⌈ 3
δ
· log ( 2
γ
)⌉
. Assume δ ≥ 2e−n and
` < L + 1. Let C be an L-restricted circuit, having inputs of length `n, and let R ∈ PERM` be a permutation that is (γ , T )-good
for C. Then, given C and `, R can be described using a number of bits that is bounded by 2δNn + Ln + N log n + (log 6)N +
N log(1/δ)+ N log log(2/γ )+ N log(1/γ )+ N log T + 18n2 · L · 1
γ
· ( 1
δ
)2( log 2
γ
)2.
Proof. Since R is the `-direct product of R, it is enough to present a short description of R. We will first show that the
assumption that CR list-inverts a γ -fraction of R(x) with x ∈ {0, 1}`n implies that there exists an oracle circuit B so that BR
list-inverts a (1 − δ) fraction of R(x) with x ∈ {0, 1}n. The circuit B is not L-restricted but it has a similar property. Namely
the circuit Bmakes two categories of queries to the oracle R. The first category consists of a set of queries that do not depend
on the input. The second category depends on the input y and it consists of the queries y, R(y), . . . , RL−1(y). The circuit B is
helpful in producing the concise description of R that we are seeking. Note that the permutation R ∈ CIRC is determined by
the vector (R(1), R2(1), . . . , R(N−1)(1)). This vector will be described in the following way. The last L entries are described
by themselves. Then we describe each of the other entries y one at a time going backwards in the vector. Suppose that
R(y), R2(y), . . . , RL(y) are already described. We describe now the preceding term in the sequence, which is y. There are
two cases.
Case 1: BR list-inverts R(y). In this case y is determined by its rank in the T -list produced by BR on input R(y). The
computation of BR on input R(y) depends on the strings R(y), . . . , RL(y) (which are already described) and on the value
of R on the fixed queries (these values have to be given in the description, but they are common to all the entries in the
vector).
Case 2: If BR fails to list-invert y (this will happen only for a small fraction δ of y’s), then y is described by itself.
We will show that this description policy needs the asserted number of bits.
We proceed with the technical details. The amplification of the fraction of inverted inputs from γ to (1 − δ) is done
using the well-known technique of producing strong one-way functions from weak one-way functions (Yao [22]). Let
w = 6 · 1
δ
· log (2/γ ) · 1
γ
. Recall that ` = ⌈ 3
δ
· log ( 2
γ
)⌉
. It holds that, for n ≥ ln(2/δ) and δ < 1/3, `
w
< γ −(1−δ+e−n)`. Let
INV be the set of strings R(x) onwhich CR outputs a T -list that contains x. From the hypothesis, we know that ‖INV‖ ≥ γ ·2`n.
We define the following probabilistic algorithm D.
Input: y = R(x), for some x ∈ Σn. Goal: Find a short list that contains x.
LIST = ∅.
Repeat the following n · w times.
Pick random i ∈ {1, . . . , `}.
Pick `− 1 random strings in {0, 1}n denoted y1, . . . , yi−1, yi+1, . . . , y`.
Calculate Y = y1  · · ·  yi−1  R(x) yi+1  · · ·  y`.
Call the circuit CR to invert Y . CR returns a T -list of `-tuples in ({0, 1}n)`.
(Note: In case of success one of these `-tuples is
(R−1(y1), . . . , R−1(yi−1), x, R−1(yi−1), . . . , R−1(y`)).)
Add to LIST the ith component of every `-tuple in the list produced by CR.
End Repeat
We say that the above algorithm is successful on input y = R(x) if, at the conclusion of the algorithm, LIST contains x.
We estimate the success probability of the above circuit on input y = R(x).
Let N(y) be the multiset of `-tuples having y as one component where the multiplicity of a tuple is the number of
occurrences of y in the tuple. For a set A ⊆ {0, 1}n, we define N(A) = ⋃y∈A N(y). It can be seen that, for all y ∈ {0, 1}n,
‖N(y)‖ = ` · 2n(`−1). We define
Vw =
{
y ∈ {0, 1}n | ‖N(y) ∩ INV‖‖N(y)‖ ≥
1
w
}
.
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Let Vw be the complement of Vw . We have
‖N(Vw) ∩ INV‖ ≤
∑
y∈Vw
‖N(y) ∩ INV‖
< 2n · 1
w
· (` · 2n(`−1))
= `
w
· ‖(Σn)`‖.
We show that this is possible only if ‖Vw‖ < (δ − e−n) · ‖Σn‖. Let A ⊆ Σn be a set with ‖A‖ ≥ (δ − en) · ‖Σn‖. We
observe that N(A) covers an overwhelming fraction of (Σn)`. Indeed, note that the probability that a tuple (y1, . . . , y`) is
not in N(A) is equal to the probability of the event ‘‘y1 6∈ A ∧ · · · ∧ y` 6∈ A’’ which is bounded by (1− δ+ e−n)`. Therefore,
the complementary set of N(A), denoted N(A), satisfies
‖N(A)‖ < (1− δ + e−n)` · ‖(Σn)`‖.
Then,
‖N(A) ∩ INV‖ = ‖INV‖ − ‖INV ∩ N(A)‖
≥ ‖INV‖ − ‖N(A)‖
>
[
γ − (1− δ + e−n)`]‖(Σn)`‖.
Recall that `/w <
[
γ − (1− δ + e−n)`]. Thus necessarily ‖Vw‖ < (δ − e−n) · 2n.
On input y = R(x), at each iteration, the algorithm chooses uniformly at random y in N(y). The circuit C is invoked next
to invert R(y). The algorithm succeeds if and only if y ∈ INV. For all y ∈ Vw , ‖N(y)∩INV‖‖N(y)‖ ≥ 1w , and thus the probability
that one iteration fails conditioned by y ∈ Vw is ≤ (1 − (1/w)). Since the procedure does n · w iterations, the probability
over y ∈ {0, 1}n and over the random bits used by the algorithm D, conditioned by y ∈ Vw , that y is not list-inverted is
≤ (1− (1/w))n·w < e−n. Therefore the probability that y is not list-inverted is bounded by the probability that y 6∈ Vw plus
the above conditional probability of failure-to-list-invert. Thus, it is bounded by δ − e−n + e−n = δ.
Note that the algorithm D is using at each iteration the random strings y1, . . . , yi−1, yi+1, . . . , y` and there are n · w
iterations. There is a way to fix these random strings used by D so that the circuit B that is obtained from D by using the fixed
bits instead of random bits list-inverts a fraction of at least (1− δ) of the strings x ∈ {0, 1}n. There are n · w · (`− 1) fixed
strings.
Assuming that the circuit C and ` are given, the permutation R can be described, using the previously-discussed
procedure, from
• 2δ · N · n bits that encode the δN elements that B fails to list-invert and the value of R at these points.
• The last L positions in the circular permutation R. This requires L · n bits.
• For each of the (1 − δ)N strings x that are list-inverted by C , the rank of x in the generated LIST. This requires
(1− δ) · N · (log n+ logw + log T ) bits.
• The set of n · w · (` − 1) fixed strings y and the value of R on y, R(y), . . . , RL−1(y) for every fixed y. This requires
n · w · (`− 1) · n+ n · w · (`− 1) · L · n ≤ n2w`L bits (for `− 1 < L).
The total number of bits needed for the description (given B) is bounded by
2δNn+ Ln+ (1− δ)N log n+ (1− δ)N logw + (1− δ)N log T + n2w`L.
Plugging the values of ` andw, we obtain that the description of R is bounded by 2δNn+Ln+N log n+(log 6)N+N log(1/δ)+
N log log(2/γ )+ N log(1/γ )+ N log T + 18n2 · L · 1
γ
· ( 1
δ
)2( log 2
γ
)2. 
Wewant to estimate the number of permutations that are (γ , T )-good for some L-restricted circuit C . We state the result
for a particular combination of parameters that will be of interest in our application. The extractor construction will involve
the parametersm ∈ N and  > 0. We will have γ = /m, T = m2 · (1/2), and L = m.
Lemma 4.4. Let n ∈ N,m ∈ N,  > 0, δ > 0. Let N = 2n. Consider γ = /m and T = m2 · (1/2). Let ` = d(3/δ) log(2/γ )e.
Assume that δ = O(1) and m2 · (1/) = o(N/n4). Let C be an m-restricted circuit, with inputs of length `n. Then the number of
permutations R in PERM` that are (γ , T )-good for C is bounded by 2h, where h = 3δ · N · n+ 3N logm+ 3N log(1/).
Proof. Under the assumptions in the hypothesis, Lemma 4.3 implies that any permutation that is (γ , T )-good for C can be
described with h bits. The conclusion follows immediately. 
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5. Analysis of the construction of pseudo-random generators from one-way permutations
We recall the classic construction (Blum and Micali [1] and Yao [22]) of a pseudo-random generator from a one-way
permutation. The construction starts with a one-way permutation R : {0, 1}`n → {0, 1}`n. In the classical setting, we work
under the assumption that no circuit of some bounded size inverts R(x) except for a small fraction of x in the domain of R.
Step 1. We consider the predicate b : {0, 1}`n×{0, 1}`n → {0, 1} defined by b(x, r) = x · r (the inner product modulo 2).
By thewell-knownGoldreich–Levin Theorem [4], b(x, r) is a hard-core predicate for R(x)r , i.e., no circuit of an appropriate
bounded size can calculate b(x, r) from R(x) r except with a probability very close to 1/2. More precisely, it holds that if
a probabilistic circuit C1 on input R(x)  r calculates b(x, r) with probability 1/2 +  (the probability is over x, r , and the
random bits used by C1) then there is a circuit C2 not much larger than C1 which for a 3/4 fraction of x list-inverts x. (In
the classical setting this is in conflict with the above assumption, because one can check the elements from the list one by
one till x is determined.) Lemma 5.3 proves this fact adapted to an information-theoretic context (actually, in our setting,
the fact holds with stronger parameters).
Step 2. The function HR : {0, 1}2`n → {0, 1}2`n+1, given by HR(x, r) = R(x)  r  b(x, r), can be shown to be a pseudo-
random generator with extension 1. More precisely, it holds that if C2 is a circuit that distinguishesHR(x, r) fromU2`n+1 with
bias , one can build a circuit C3, not much larger than C2, that on input R(x) r calculates b(x, r) correctly with probability
at least 1/2+ . Lemma 5.2 proves this fact adapted to an information-theoretic context.
Step 3. We define GR(x, r) by the following algorithm.
Input: R a permutation of {0, 1}`n, x ∈ {0, 1}`n, r ∈ {0, 1}`n.
For i = 0 tom− 1, bi = r · (Ri(x)).
Output b0  b1  · · ·  bm−1.
It can be shown that under the given assumption, GR is a pseudo-random generator. More precisely, it holds that if a
circuit C4 distinguishes GR from Um with bias , then there is a circuit C3, not much larger than C4, so that C3 distinguishes
HR(x, r) from U2`n+1 with bias at least /m. Lemma 5.1 proves this fact adapted to an information-theoretic context.
We need to establish the properties of the above transformations (Steps 1, 2, and 3) in an information-theoretic context
because theywill be used for the construction of an extractor. In our setting R : {0, 1}`n → {0, 1}`n is a random permutation
and C4 is a statistical test. We will show that there are some circuits C1,1, . . . , C1,2m+1−4 such that if R does not hit C4 -
correctly via G, then R is (/m,m2/2)-good for some C1,i, and thus, by the results in the previous section, R has a short
description. In our context, the size of the different circuits appearing in Steps 1, 2, and 3will be considered to be unbounded.
What matters is the number and the pattern of queries, i.e., the fact that C3, C2 and C1 are restricted circuits. This is an
information-theoretic feature. The following lemmas follow closely the standard proofs, only that, in addition, they analyze
the pattern of queries made by the circuits involved.
Lemma 5.1 (Analysis of Step 3). For any circuit C4 there are 2m−1 − 1 circuits C3,1, C3,2, . . . , C3,2m−1−1 such that:
(1) If R is a permutation with
|Probx,r(GR(x, r) ∈ C4)− Prob(Um ∈ C4)| > ,
(i.e., R does not hit C4 -correctly via G), then there is i ∈ {1, . . . , 2m−1 − 1} such that
|Prob(HR(U`n,U ′`n) ∈ CR3,i)− Prob(U2`n+1 ∈ CR3,i)| >

m
.
(2) All the circuits C3,i are (m− 2)-restricted.
Proof. For k ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}, we define the distributions
dk = Uk  (U`n · U ′`n) (R(U`n) · U ′`n) · · ·  (Rm−k−1(U`n) · U ′`n),
where Uk, U`n, and U ′`n are distinct instances of the uniform distributions on {0, 1}k, {0, 1}`n, and {0, 1}`n, respectively.
Suppose that a permutation R satisfies
Probx,r(GR(x, r) ∈ C4)− Prob(Um ∈ C4) > . (2)
In thenewnotation, the above reads Prob(d0 ∈ C4)−Prob(dm−1 ∈ C4) > . This implies that there is some k ∈ {0, . . . ,m−2}
such that Prob(dk ∈ C4)− Prob(dk+1 ∈ C4) > /m. For z1 ∈ {0, 1}`n, z2 ∈ {0, 1}`n, z3 ∈ {0, 1}, we define
f (z1  z2  z3) = z3  (z1 · z2) (R(z1) · z2) · · ·  (Rm−k−2(z1) · z2).
Note that
dk = Uk  f (R(U`n) U ′`n  (U`n · U ′`n))
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and
dk+1 = Uk  f (U`n  U ′`n  U1).
Wedefine the following circuitD that is able to distinguishHR(U`n,U
′
`n) fromU2`n+1. The input ofD is a string y ∈ {0, 1}2`n+1,
which we break into y = y1  y2  y3, with y1 and y2 in {0, 1}`n, and y3 ∈ {0, 1}. The circuit D on input y ∈ {0, 1}2`n+1,
chooses a k-bits long string u, calculates f (y1, y2, y3) using the oracle R and simulates C4 on input u  f (y1, y2, y3). Note
that the calculation of f (y1, y2, y3) requires at most the query of the strings y1, R(y1), . . . , Rm−3(y1). Thus, D is an (m− 2)-
restricted circuit. Clearly, Probu,y(y ∈ DR) = Prob(dk+1 ∈ C4) and Probu,x,r(HR(x, r) ∈ DR) = Prob(dk ∈ C4). Therefore,
Probu,x,r(HR(x, r) ∈ DR)−Probu,y(y ∈ DR) > /m. By fixing in all possible ways k ∈ {0, . . . ,m−2} and then the k-bits long
string u, we obtain 2m−1 − 1 circuits, denoted C3,1, . . . , C3,2m−1−1, that act like D except that the random bits are replaced
by the fixed bits. The argument above shows that if R satisfies Eq. (2), then there is one circuit C3,i in the above set of circuits
such that Probx,r(HR(x, r) ∈ CR3,i) − Proby(y ∈ CR3,i) > /m. The circuits C3,i are (m − 2)-restricted circuits. With a similar
proof, one can see that if
Prob(Um ∈ C4)− Probx,r(GR(x, r) ∈ C4) > , (3)
then there is one circuit C3,i such that Proby(y ∈ CR3,i)− Probx,r(HR(x, r) ∈ CR3,i) > /m. 
Lemma 5.2 (Analysis of Step 2). Let C3 be an oracle circuit that is L-restricted, for some parameter L. There are four oracle circuits
C2,1, C2,2, C2,3, C2,4 such that
(1) If a permutation R satisfies
|Probx,r(HR(x r) ∈ CR3 )− Prob(U2`n+1 ∈ CR3 )| > ,
then there is i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} such that
Probx,r(CR2,i(R(x) r) = b(x, r)) >
1
2
+ .
(2) The four circuits are L-restricted.
Proof. We define the oracle circuit B that on input R(x) r runs as follows. It chooses a random bit u and then it simulates
the circuit CR3 to determine if R(x)  r  u belongs to CR3 or not. If the answer is YES, the output is u, and if the answer is
NO, the output is 1 − u. We also define the circuit D in a similar way, with the only change that the YES/NO branches are
permuted. Note that B and D are both circuits that are L-restricted.
Recall that HR(x, r) = R(x)  r  b(x, r). Let us suppose that for some permutation R, Probx,r(R(x)  r  b(x, r)) ∈
CR3 )−Prob(U2`n+1 ∈ CR3 ) > . Note that Probx,r(R(x)rb(x, r)) ∈ CR3 )−Prob(U2`n+1 ∈ CR3 ) = (Probx,r(R(x)rb(x, r)) ∈
CR3 )− ProbU1,x,r(R(x) r  U1) ∈ CR3 ))+ (ProbU1,x,r(R(x) r  U1) ∈ CR3 )− Prob(U2`n+1 ∈ CR3 )). The second term is equal
to zero, because R is a permutation and, thus, U1  R(x)  r is actually the uniform distribution on {0, 1}2`n+1. Therefore,
Probx,r(R(x) r  b(x, r)) ∈ CR3 )− ProbU1,x,r(R(x) r U1) ∈ CR3 ) > . According to Yao’s lemma that connects predictors
to distinguishers (for a proof see, for example, [23, pp. 162]), it follows that Probu,x,r(BR(R(x)  r) = b(x, r)) > 12 + .
Let B0 (B1) be the circuit that is obtained from B by fixing bit u to 0 (respectively, to 1). Then at least one of the events
‘‘B0(R(x) R) = b(x, r)’’ or ‘‘B1(R(x) R) = b(x, r)’’ has probability> 12 + .
If Probz(z ∈ CR3 )− Probx,r(R(x) r  b(x, r)) ∈ CR3 ) > , then the same argument works for the circuit D, and we obtain
two deterministic circuits D0 and D1. The four circuits B0, B1,D0 and D1 satisfy the requirements. 
Lemma 5.3 (Analysis of Step 1). Let C2 be an oracle circuit that is L-restricted for some parameter L. Then there is a circuit C1
such that
(1) If R is a permutation such that Probx,r(CR2 (R(x) r) = b(x, r)) > 12 + , then for at least a fraction  of x ∈ {0, 1}`n, CR1 on
input y = R(x) outputs a list of 1/2 strings that contains x (i.e., R is (, 1/2)-good for C1).
(2) The circuit C1 is L-restricted.
Proof. Suppose that R : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}`n satisfies Probx,r(CR2 (R(x)  r) = b(x, r)) > (1/2) + . Then, by a standard
averaging argument, for a fraction  of x in {0, 1}`n, Probr(CR2 (R(x) r) = b(x, r)) > (1/2)+ (/2). Consider such an x and
let Had(x) denote the encoding of x via the Hadamard error-correcting code (see [18]). By the definition of the Hadamard
code, b(x, r) is just the rth bit of Had(x). Thus the string u = CR2 (R(x) (0 · · · 0)) · · ·  CR2 (R(x) (1 . . . 1)) agrees with
Had(x) on at least a fraction (1/2)+ (/2) of positions. Since the circuit C2 is L-restricted, the string u can be calculated by
querying only y, R(y), . . . , R
L−1
(y), where y = R(x). By brute force we can determine the list of all strings z so that Had(z)
agrees with u in at least 12 + 2 positions. It is known (see, for example, [23, pp. 218]) that there are at most 14 ·
( 2

)2 = ( 1

)2
such strings z and one of them is x. 
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By combining Lemma 5.1, Lemma 5.2, and Lemma 5.3, we obtain the following fact.
Lemma 5.4. Let C4 be a circuit. Then there are 2m+1 − 4 circuits C1,1, . . . , C1,2m+1−4 such that
(1) If R is a permutation with
|Probx,r(GR(x, r) ∈ C4)− Prob(Um ∈ C4)| > ,
(i.e., R does not hit C4 -correctly via G), then there is some circuit C1,i such that for at least a fraction m of x, C
R
1,i on input
R(x) outputs a list of m2 · ( 1

)2 strings that contains x (i.e., R is (/m,m2/2)-good for C1,i).
(2) All the circuits C1,i are (m− 2)-restricted.
6. An extractor from a cryptographic pseudo-random generator
We first build a special type of extractor in which the weakly-random string is the truth-table of a permutation in PERM.
The following parameters will be used throughout this section. Let  > 0, δ > 0, and n,m ∈ N be parameters. Let
N = 2n. Let ` = d(3/δ) log(2m · (1/))e. We consider the set of permutations PERM`. We assume that δ = O(1) and
m2 · (1/) = o(N/n4).
Let G : PERM` × ({0, 1}`n × {0, 1}`n) → {0, 1}m be the function defined by the following algorithm (the same as the
algorithm for GR from the previous section).
Parameters: ` ∈ N,m ∈ N.
Input: R ∈ PERM`, (x, r) ∈ {0, 1}`n × {0, 1}`n.
For i = 0 tom− 1, bi = r · Ri(x).
Output b0  b1  · · ·  bm−1.
The following lemma, in view of Lemma 2.2, shows that G is an extractor for the special case of weakly-random strings
that are truth-tables of permutations in PERM`.
Lemma 6.1. Let C4 be a test for strings of length m (i.e., C4 ⊆ {0, 1}m). Let GOOD(C4) = {R ∈ PERM` |
R does not hit C4 -correctly via G}. Then ‖GOOD(C4)‖< 2m+h+1, where h = 3δNn+ 3N logm+ 3N log(1/).
Proof. Let C1,1, . . . , C1,2m+1−4 be the 2m+1 − 4 circuits implied by Lemma 5.4 to exist (corresponding to the test C4). Let R
be in GOOD(C4). Then Lemma 5.4 shows that there is a circuit C1,i from the above list having the following property: For
at least a fraction γ = /m of strings x ∈ {0, 1}`n, CR1,i on input R(x) returns a list having T = m2 · (1/2) strings, one of
which is x. Thus, R is (γ , T )-good for C1,i (recall Definition 4.2). It follows that the set of permutations R ∈ PERM` that do
not hit C4 -correctly via G is included in
⋃2m+1−4
1 {R ∈ PERM` | R is (γ , T )-good for C1,i}. Lemma 4.4 shows, that, for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , 2m+1 − 4}, ‖{R ∈ PERM` | R is (γ , T )-good for C1,i}‖ ≤ 2h, where h = 3δ · N · n+ 3N logm+ 3N log(1/). The
conclusion follows. 
In order to obtain a standard extractor (rather than the special type given by Lemma 6.1), the only thing that remains to
be done is to transform a random binary string X into a permutation R ∈ CIRC, which determines R ∈ PERM` that is used in
the function G given above.
Note that a permutation R ∈ CIRC is specified by (R(1), R2(1), . . . , RN−1(1)), which is an arbitrary permutation of the
set {2, 3, . . . ,N}. Consequently, we need to generate permutations of the set {1, 2, . . . ,N − 1} (which can be viewed as
permutations of {2, 3, . . . ,N} in the obvious way). We can use the standard procedure that transforms a function mapping
[N−1] to [N−1] into a permutation of the same type. To avoid someminor truncation nuisances, we actually use a function
X : [N] → [N].
Input: X : [N] → [N].
for i = 1 to N − 1, R(i) = i (initially R is the identity permutation).
Loop 2:
for i = 1 to N − 1
Y (i) = 1+ (X(i) mod i).
Loop 3:
for i = 1 to N − 1
Swap R(i)with R(Y (i)).
Output: permutation R : [N − 1] → [N − 1].
We want to estimate the number of functions X : [N] → [N] that map via the above procedure to a given permutation
R : [N − 1] → [N − 1]. We call a sequence (Y (1), . . . , Y (N)) a *-sequence if, for all i, Y (i) ∈ {1, . . . , i}. Observe that,
using Loop 3, a *-sequence (Y (1), . . . , Y (N − 1)) defines a unique permutation (R(1), . . . , R(N − 1)), and thus it is enough
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to estimate the maximum number of functions X : [N] → [N] that map via Loop 2 in the above procedure in a given *-
sequence (Y (1), . . . , Y (N − 1)) (the maximum is taken over all *-sequences of length N − 1). We denote this number by
A(N). A (rough) upper bound can be established as follows.
A(N) ≤
⌈N
1
⌉
·
⌈N
2
⌉
· . . . ·
⌈ N
N − 1
⌉
≤
(N
1
+ 1
)
·
(N
2
+ 1
)
· . . . ·
( N
N − 1 + 1
)
= (N + 1)(N + 2) · . . . · (2N − 1)
1 · 2 · . . . · (N − 1)
=
(
2N − 1
N − 1
)
≤ 22N .
We can now present the (standard) extractor. We choose the parameters as follows. Fix n ∈ N and let N = 2n and
N = n · 2n. Let λ ∈ (0, 1) be a constant. Let α > 0, β > 0 be constants such that α < λ/3, β < (λ − 3α)/4. Let  ≥ N−β
and m ≤ Nα . Take δ = (λ − 4β − 3α)/4 and ` = d(3/δ) log(2m · (1/))e. The weakly-random string X has length N and
is viewed as the truth-table of a function mapping [N] to [N]. The seed is of the form y = (x, r) ∈ {0, 1}`n × {0, 1}`n. We
first transform X into a permutation R(X) ∈ PERM` using the above algorithm and then taking the `-product. We define the
extractor E : {0, 1}N × {0, 1}2`n → {0, 1}m by E(X, (x, r)) = G(R(X), (x, r)). More explicitly, the extractor is defined by the
following procedure.
Parameters: n ∈ N,N ∈ N, λ > 0,  > 0, ` ∈ N,m ∈ N, satisfying the above requirements.
Inputs: The weakly-random string X ∈ {0, 1}N , viewed as the truth-table of a function X : [N] → [N]; the seed
y = (x, r) ∈ {0, 1}`n × {0, 1}`n.
Step 1. Transform X into a permutation RX ∈ PERM`. The transformation is performed by the above procedure which
yields a permutation R ∈ CIRC, and, next, RX is the `-direct product of R.
Step 2. For i = 0 tom− 1, bi = r · RiX (x).
Output b0  b1  · · ·  bm−1, which is denoted E(X, y).
We have defined a function E : {0, 1}N × {0, 1}2`n → {0, 1}m. Note that the seed length 2`n is O(log2 N) and the output
lengthm is N
α
, for an arbitrary α < λ/3.
Theorem 6.2. The function E is a (λN, 2)-extractor.
Proof. Let C4 be a subset of {0, 1}m. Taking into account Lemma 2.2, it is enough to show that the number of strings
X ∈ {0, 1}N that do not hit C4 -correctly via E is at most 2λN−log(1/). Let X ∈ {0, 1}N be a string that does not hit C4 -
correctly via E. By the definition of E, it follows that RX does not hit C4 -correctly via G. By Lemma 6.1, there are at most
2m+h+1 permutations R ∈ PERM` that do not hit C4 -correctly via G, where h = 3δNn+ 3N logm+ 3N log(1/). Since the
number of functions X : [N] → [N] that map into a given permutation R ∈ PERM` is at most A(N) < 22N , it follows that
‖{X ∈ {0, 1}N | X does not hit C4 -correctly}‖ < 22N · 2m+h+1 < 2λN−log(1/), where the last inequality follows from the
choice of parameters. 
7. A bitwise locally computable extractor
Wepresent a bitwise locally computable extractor: Each bit of the output string can be calculated separately inO(log2 N),
whereN is the length of theweakly-random string. The proof uses the same plan as for the extractor in Section 6, except that
the weakly-random string X is viewed as the truth-table of an arbitrary function (not necessarily a permutation) and the
‘‘consecutive’’ values that are used in the extractor are X(x), X(x+1), . . . , X(x+m−1) (instead of R(x), R2(x), . . . , Rm−1(x)
used in Section 6).
The parameter n ∈ Nwill be considered fixed throughout this section. We denote N = 2n and N = n · N . The parameter
m ∈ N will be specified later (it will be a subunitary power of N). For two binary strings x and r of the same length, b(x, r)
denotes the inner product of x and r viewed as vectors over the field GF(2).
The weakly-random string X has length N , and is viewed as the truth-table of a function X : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. For some
` ∈ N that will be specified later we define X : {0, 1}`n → {0, 1}`n by X(x1  · · ·  x`) = X(x1)  · · ·  X(x`), i.e., X is
the `-direct product of X . We also denote x = x1  · · ·  x`. The seed of the extractor will be (x, r) ∈ {0, 1}`n × {0, 1}`n.
We define x + 1 = (x1 + 1)  · · ·  (x` + 1) (where the addition is done modulo 2n) and inductively, for any k ∈ N,
x+ k+ 1 = (x+ k)+ 1. The extractor is defined by
E(X, (x, r)) = b(X(x), r) b(X(x+ 1), r) · · ·  b(X(x+m− 1), r). (4)
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A set D ⊆ {0, 1}m is called a test. We say that X hits a test D -correctly via E if |Probx,r(E(X, (x, r)) ∈ D) − ‖D‖‖{0,1}m‖ | ≤ .
We want to show that the number of functions X that do not hit D -correctly via E is small and then use Lemma 2.2. To this
aim we investigate the properties of a function X that does not hit a test D ⊆ {0, 1}m -correctly via E.
Lemma 7.1. Let D ⊆ {0, 1}m be a fixed set. Then there are 2m+2 − 4 circuits C1, . . . C2m+2−4 such that if X does not hit D -
correctly, then there is some circuit Ci, i ∈ {1, . . . , 2m+2 − 4}, such that
Probx,r (Ci on input b(X(x−m+ 1), r) · · ·  b(X(x− 1), r)
outputs b(X(x), r)) ≥ 1/2+ /m.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proofs of Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2. Let X : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a function that does not hit D
-correctly via E. This means that |Probx,r(E(X, (x, r)) ∈ D)− Prob(Um ∈ D)| > . Let us first suppose that
Probx,r(E(X, (x, r)) ∈ D)− Prob(Um ∈ D) > . (5)
For each k ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}, we define the hybrid distribution dk given by
dk = b(X(x), r) b(X(x+ 1), r) · · ·  b(X(x+m− k− 1), r) Uk
and
dm = Um.
Eq. (5) states that Prob(d0 ∈ D) − Prob(dm ∈ D) > . Using the standard argument, it follows that there exists
k ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1} such that Prob(dk ∈ D) − Prob(dk+1 ∈ D) > /m. We build a probabilistic circuit C that on input
b(X(x), r) b(X(x+ 1), r) · · ·  b(X(x+m− k− 2), r) attempts to calculate b(X(x+m− k− 1), r).
Circuit C .
Input: v0  v1  · · ·  vm−k−2, each vi ∈ {0, 1}. (In case k = m− 1, there is no input.)
Choose randomly u ∈ {0, 1}, t ∈ {0, 1}k.
If v0  v1  · · ·  vm−k−2  u t ∈ D, return u. Else return 1− u.
By Yao’s lemma on predictors versus distinguishers, it holds that
Probx,r (C on input b(X(x), r) · · ·  b(X(x+m− k− 2), r)
outputs b(X(x+m− k− 1), r)) ≥ 1/2+ /m,
where the probability is taken over x ∈ {0, 1}`n, r ∈ {0, 1}`n and the random bits used by C . The procedure C uses k + 1
random bits (for u and t), and k ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1}. By considering all possibilities for k and by fixing the (k + 1) bits in all
possible ways, we obtain 21 + · · · + 2m = 2m+1 − 2 circuits C1, . . . , C2m+1−2 with the desired property.
In the alternative (to Eq. (5)) case
Prob(Um ∈ D)− Prob(E(X, (x, r)) ∈ D) > ,
we obtain in a similar way another set of 2m+1 − 2 circuits. 
The next lemma is an analogue of Lemma 5.3. It states that if there exists a circuit C with the property indicated in
Lemma 7.1, then, from X(x−m+ 1), . . . , X(x− 1), one can compute, in a weak but non-trivial way, X(x).
Lemma 7.2. Let C be a circuit. Then there is a circuit B such that the following holds. Suppose X : {0, 1}`n → {0, 1}`n is a function
such that
Probx,r (C(b(X(x−m+ 1), r) · · ·  b(X(x− 1), r)) = b(X(x), r))
≥ (1/2)+ (/m).
Then, for at least a fraction /m of x in {0, 1}`n, B on input X(x−m+ 1)· · · X(x− 1) outputs a list of m2 · (1/2) elements,
one of which is X(x).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 5.3. Let C and X be as in the hypothesis. By an averaging argument, it
follows that for a fraction (/m) of x in {0, 1}`n,
Probr (C(b(X(x−m+ 1), r) · · ·  b(X(x− 1), r) = b(X(x), r))
≥ (1/2)+ /(2m). (6)
Let Had(x) denote the encoding of a string x via the Hadamard error-correcting code. By the definition of the Hadamard
code, b(x, r) is just the rth bit of Had(x). Consider the binary string u(x) ∈ {0, 1}2`n whose rth bit is C(b(X(x−m+ 1), r)
· · ·  b(X(x− 1), r) (here r ∈ {0, . . . , 2`n − 1} is written in base 2 on `n bits for the sake of the definition of b). Clearly, the
string u(x) can be calculated from X(x−m+ 1), . . . , X(x− 1). The Eq. (6) implies that, for a fraction (/m) of x ∈ {0, 1}`n,
u(x) agrees with Had(X(x)) on at least 1/2 + /(2m) positions. By brute force, we can determine all the strings z so that
Had(z) agrees with u(x) in at least 12 + /(2m) positions. It is known that there are at most 14 ·
( 2m

)2 = (m

)2 such strings z
and, by the above discussion, one of them is X(x). 
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The key property of the circuit B in the above lemma is captured in the following definition (which is analogous to
Definition 4.2).
Definition 7.3. Let B be a circuit. A function X : {0, 1}`n → {0, 1}`n is (γ , T )-good for B if for at least a γ fraction of
x ∈ {0, 1}`n, B on input X(x−m+ 1) · · ·  X(x− 1) outputs a T - list of strings, one of which is X(x).
We choose the parameters in the same way as in Section 4. The parameters  and m will be specified later. We take δ > 0,
γ = /m, T = m2/2, ` = d(3/δ) log(2/γ )e andw = d6 · (1/δ) · log(2/γ ) · (1/γ )e.
The next two lemmas are the analogues of Lemma 4.3. The first lemma shows the amplification effect obtained by taking
the `-direct product.
Lemma 7.4. The parameters are as specified above. Let B be a circuit. Then there is an oracle circuit A such that:
(1) If X is (γ , T )-good for B, then, for a fraction (1−δ) of x in {0, 1}n, the circuit A, on input x and X(x−m+1)· · ·X(x−1)
and with access to oracle X restricted as shown in (2), outputs a list containing n · w · T elements, one of which is X(x).
(2) The oracle circuit A queries a set of n · w · (`− 1) · (m− 1) strings that do not depend on the input.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the first part of the proof of Lemma4.3. Let GOODbe the set of strings x in {0, 1}`n such that
the circuit B, on input X(x−m+1)· · ·X(x−1), calculates a T -list that contains X(x). By hypothesis, ‖GOOD‖ ≥ γ ·2`n.
We consider the following algorithm A′ that can query the oracle X : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n in several random positions.
Input: x ∈ {0, 1}n, and X(x−m+ 1), . . . , X(x− 1) ∈ ({0, 1}n)m−1. The algorithm can pose random queries to the oracle
X : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. The goal is to calculate a list of strings that contains X(x).
LIST = ∅.
Repeat the following n · w times.
Pick random i ∈ {1, . . . , `}.
Pick `− 1 random strings in {0, 1}n denoted x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , x`.
By querying the oracle X , find, for each xj, the strings X(xj −m+ 1), X(xj −m+ 2), . . . , X(xj − 1).
Let x = (x1, . . . , xi−1, x, xi+1, . . . , x`). Build the string X(x−m+ 1) X(x−m+ 2) · · ·  X(x− 1). Run the circuit B
on input X(x−m+ 1) X(x−m+ 2) · · ·  X(x− 1).
The circuit B returns a T -list of `-tuples in ({0, 1}n)`.
(Note: In case of success, one of these `-tuples is
X(x) = X(x1), . . . , X(xi−1), X(x), X(xi+1) . . . , X(x`))
Add to LIST the ith component of every `-tuple in the list produced by B.
End Repeat
We say that the above algorithm is successful on input x if, at the conclusion of the algorithm, LIST contains X(x).
We estimate the success probability of the above circuit on input x. Let N(x) be the multiset of `-tuples having x as one
component where the multiplicity of a tuple is the number of occurrences of x in the tuple. On input x, at each iteration,
the algorithm chooses uniformly at random x in N(x). The algorithm succeeds at that iteration if and only if x ∈ GOOD. By
following the same arguments and the same calculations as in Lemma 4.3, we conclude that the probability that algorithm
A′ succeeds on x is at least (1 − δ), where the probability is taken over x and the random strings used by A′. Note that the
algorithm A′ is using at each iteration the random strings x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , x`, and there are n · w iterations. For each
such random string xj, A′ needs the (m − 1) values X(xj − m + 1), X(xj − m + 2), . . . , X(xj − 1). There is a way to fix the
above random strings so that the circuit A, which results from A′ by using the fixed strings instead of the random strings,
succeeds on at least a (1− δ) fraction of the strings x ∈ {0, 1}n. Therefore, the circuit A has the desired properties. 
Lemma 7.5. The parameters are as specified above. Let A be an oracle circuit and X : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a function such that
A and X satisfy the conditions (1) and (2) in Lemma 7.4. More precisely, we assume that:
(1) For a fraction (1− δ) of x in {0, 1}n, the circuit A, on input x and X(x−m+ 1) · · · X(x− 1) and with access to oracle
X restricted as shown in (2), outputs a list containing n · w · T elements, one of which is X(x).
(2) The oracle circuit A queries a set of n · w · (`− 1) · (m− 1) strings that do not depend on the input.
Then, given A, X can be described using a number of bits bounded by 2δNn + mn + N log n + (log 6)N + N log(1/δ) +
N log log(2/γ )+ N log(1/γ )+ N log T + 36n2 ·m · 1
γ
· ( 1
δ
)2( log 2
γ
)2.
Proof. The oracle circuit A allows a short description of the strings X(x) for the fraction of (1− δ) of the strings x ∈ {0, 1}n
given in assumption (1). Namely, such a string X(x) is completely determined by the circuit A, by the value of X for the fixed
set of queries given in assumption (2), by the previous m − 1 values X(x − m + 1), . . . , X(x − 1), and by the rank of X(x)
in the list returned by A on input x, X(x−m+ 1), . . . , X(x− 1). Thus, the truth-table of the function X : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
can be described (given the circuit A) using the following information.
• 2δ · N · n bits that encode the set of δN elements on which A fails and the value of X at these points.
• The ‘‘first’’m− 1 values X(0), . . . , X(m− 1). This information requires (m− 1) · n bits. (Here, X(i) represents the value
of X at the ith string in {0, 1}n, lexicographically ordered.)
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• For each of the (1 − δ)N strings y on which A succeeds, the rank of X(x) in the list returned by A. This requires
(1− δ) · N · (log n+ logw + log T ) bits.
• The set of n ·w · (`− 1) · (m− 1) fixed strings that are queried by A and the value of X at these strings. This information
requires 2n2 · w · (`− 1) · (m− 1) bits.
The total number of bits needed for the description ofX (givenA) is bounded by 2δNn+m·n+(1−δ)N log n+(1−δ)N logw+
(1−δ)N log T+2n2 ·w·(`−1)·(m−1). Keeping into account that ` = d(3/δ) log(2/γ )e andw = d6·(1/δ)·log(2/γ )·(1/γ )e,
the conclusion follows. 
We make the final choice of parameters. Let n ∈ N and the constant λ ∈ (0, 1). Recall that N = 2n and N = n · N . We
take the constants α < λ/3, β < (λ − 3α)/4 and δ = (λ − 3α − 4β)/4. We also take the output length m ≤ Nα and the
extractor bias  ≥ N−β . Note that ` = d(3/δ) log(2m/)e = O(n).
Theorem 7.6. Assume that the parameters N, λ,m, ` and  satisfy the above requirements. Then the function E : {0, 1}N ×
{0, 1}2`n → {0, 1}m, given in Eq. (4), is a (λN, 2)-extractor.
Proof. Assume X ∈ {0, 1}N does not hit a test D ⊆ {0, 1}m -correctly via E. Then X can be described by one of the circuits
C1, . . . , C2m+2−4, given by Lemma 7.1, and, according to Lemma 7.5, by a string of length h, where h ≤ 2δNn+mn+N log n+
(log 6)N+N log(1/δ)+N log log(2/γ )+N log(1/γ )+N log T+36n2 ·m· 1
γ
·( 1
δ
)2( log 2
γ
)2. Thus, the number of strings X that
do not hit D -correctly via E is bounded by 2m+2+h. For our choice of parameters, it holds thatm+ 2+ h ≤ λN − log(1/).
Therefore, by Lemma 2.2, E is a (λN, 2)-extractor. 
The construction scheme of the last extractor (given in Eq. (4)) allows some flexibility in the choice of parameters and,
in particular, we can obtain an extractor with seed length logarithmic in the length of the weakly-random string. Namely,
we can consider the weakly-random string X to be the truth-table of a function of type X : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}N1 , where
N1 >> n. We use the same value of `, and we take the `-direct product of X and obtain X : {0, 1}`n → {0, 1}`N1 . Clearly,
|X(x)| = `N1. To get a short seed we need to replace the Hadamard code (recall that the function b(x, r) gives the rth
bit of Had(x)) by an error-correcting code with a good list-decoding property that has a better rate. For example the code
given in [3], which we denote Code, is of the type Code : {0, 1}n˜ → {0, 1}n, with n = O(n˜ · (1/)4), is computable in
polynomial time, and it has the property that any ball of radius (1/2) +  has at most O((1/)2) codewords. Similarly to
function b, we define the function c(x, r) = the rth bit of Code(x), for x ∈ {0, 1}`n and any binary string r with length
|r| = log(Code(x)) = log(` · N1 · (1/)4)+ O(1). We define the extractor E ′ by
E ′(X, (x, r)) = c(X(x), r) c(X(x+ 1), r) · · ·  c(X(x+m− 1), r). (7)
The analysis is very similar to that done for the previous extractor given in Eq. (4). For example, if we assume that  ≤ 2(1/4)n,
take N1 = 2n2 andm = 2(1/3)n, and we denote the length of X by N (i.e., N = 2n2+n), we obtain a quite simple extractor that
has seed length O(log(N)), is capable to extract from sources with min-entropy λN , for arbitrary constant λ > 0, and has
output length ≈ 2(1/3)
√
log(N). This extractor has a good seed length, however the output length is much smaller than the
min-entropy of the source.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Luca Trevisan for his insightful comments on an earlier draft of this work. This work has been partially
supported by NSF grant CCF 0634830.
References
[1] M. Blum, S. Micali, How to generate cryptographically strong sequences of pseudo-random bits, SIAM Journal on Computing 13 (4) (1984) 850–864.
[2] S. Dziembowski, U. Maurer, Optimal randomizer efficiency in the bounded-storage model, Journal of Cryptology 17 (1) (2004) 5–26 (Conference
version appeared in Proc. of STOC’02).
[3] V. Guruswamy, J. Håstad, M. Sudan, D. Zuckerman, Combinatorial bounds for list decoding, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 48 (5) (2002)
1021–1035.
[4] O. Goldreich, L. Levin, A hard-core predicate for all one-way functions, in: Proceedings of the 21st ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 1989,
pp. 25–32.
[5] R. Gennaro, L. Trevisan, Lower bounds on the efficiency of generic cryptographic constructions, in: Proceedings of the 41st IEEE Symposium on
Foundations of Computer Science, 2000.
[6] J. Håstad, R. Impagliazzo, L. Levin, M. Luby, Construction of a pseudo-random generator from any one-way function, SIAM Journal on Computing 28
(4) (1999).
[7] T. Hartman, R. Raz, On the distribution of the number of roots of polynomials and explicit logspace extractors, Random Structures & Algorithms 23
(3) (2003) 235–263.
[8] R. Impagliazzo, Very strong one-way functions and pseudo-random generators exist relative to a random oracle (manuscript), January 1996.
[9] R. Impagliazzo, A. Wigderson, P = BPP if E requires exponential circuits: Derandomizing the XOR lemma, in: Proceedings of the 29th Annual ACM
Symposium on the Theory of Computing, STOC’97, New York, May 1997. Association for Computing Machinery, pp. 220–229.
[10] C.J. Lu, Encryption against storage-bounded adversaries from on-line strong extractors, Journal of Cryptology 17 (1) (2004) 27–42.
[11] N. Nisan, A. Wigderson, Hardness vs. randomness, Journal of Computer and System Sciences 49 (1994) 149–167.
1250 M. Zimand / Theoretical Computer Science 411 (2010) 1236–1250
[12] R. Raz, O. Reingold, S. Vadhan, Extracting all the randomness and reducing the error in trevisan’s extractor, in: Proceedings of the 30thACMSymposium
on Theory of Computing, ACM Press, 1999, pp. 149–158.
[13] J. Radhakrishnan, A. Ta-Shma, Tight bounds for dispersers, extractors, and depth-two superconcentrators, SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics 13
(1) (2000) 2–24.
[14] R. Shaltiel, Recent developments in explicit constructions of extractors, Bulletin EATCS 77 (2002) 67–95.
[15] R. Shaltiel, C. Umans, Simple extractors for all min-entropies and a new pseudo-random generator, in: Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE Symposium on
Foundations of Computer Science, 2001.
[16] L. Trevisan, Constructions of near-optimal extractors using pseudo-random generators, in: Proceedings of the 30th ACM Symposium on Theory of
Computing, ACM Press, 1999, pp. 141–148.
[17] L. Trevisan, Extractors and pseudorandom generators, Journal of the ACM 48 (4) (2001) 860–879.
[18] L. Trevisan, Some applications of coding theory in computational complexity. Technical Report Report No. 43, Electronic Colloquiumon Computational
Complexity, September 2004. Available at http://www.eccc.uni-trier.de/eccc-local/Lists/TR-2004.html.
[19] A. Ta-Shma, D. Zuckerman, Extractor codes, in: Proceedings of the 33rd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2001, pp. 193–199.
[20] A. Ta-Shma, D. Zuckerman, S. Safra, Extractors from Reed-Muller codes, in: Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer
Science, 2001.
[21] S. Vadhan, On constructing locally computable extractors and cryptosystems in the bounded-storage model, J. Cryptology 17 (1) (2004) 43–77.
[22] A. Yao, Theory and application of trapdoor functions, in: Proceedings of the 23rd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 1982, pp.
80–91.
[23] M. Zimand, Computational Complexity: A Quantitative Perspective, in: North-Holland Mathematics Studies., vol. 196, Elsevier, 2004.
